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There are three main ways in which agencies regulate:
rulemaking; adjudication; and informal tools of guidance, also called
nonlegislative or interpretative rules.' Over the last two decades,
agencies have increasingly favored the use of the last of these three,
which can include statements of best practices, interpretative guides,
private warning letters, and press releases.2
Scholars are hardly unaware of this trend. In a series of papers,
writers have explored the use of informal regulation as it affects the
relationship between agencies and the federal courts, asking when
nonlegislative rules can be challenged as unenforceable for want of
process.? This Essay concerns a different question, centered on the
Copyright @ 2011 by Tim Wu.
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1. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-554 (2006).
2. The turn to informal methods has been well documented. See, e.g., Thomas McGarity,
Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1393 (1992)
(noting the "increasing tendency of agencies to engage in 'nonrule rulemaking' through
relatively less formal devices such as policy statements, interpretative rules, manuals, and other
informal devices"); David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 295 (2006) (providing
quantitative evidence of a rise in the use of "best practices" as a means of informal regulation).
3. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the
Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 279-80 (2010) (defending judicial refusal to follow scholars'
suggestions about how to distinguish between legislative and nonlegislative rules); Jacob E.
Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1719 (2007) ("Rather than asking
whether a rule is legislative to answer whether notice and comment procedures should have
been used, courts should simply ask whether notice and comment procedures were used. If they
were, the rule should be deemed legislative and binding if otherwise lawful. If they were not, the
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relationship between the agency and the regulated industry: when
might the use of such informal tools, in the form of "regulatory
threats," be desirable?
Most legal writers are implicitly or explicitly critical of the use of
threats as an alternative to rulemaking or adjudication. The general
presumption is that the use of threats is a kind of symptom of an
underlying malady-a broken rulemaking or adjudication process.
For example, Professor Lars Noah describes the use of threats as an
"intractable problem," given the difficulty of "controlling the exercise
of such wide-ranging discretionary power."' In this brief Essay, I write
in defense of regulatory threats in particular contexts.
The use of threats instead of law can be a useful choice-not
simply a procedural end run. My argument is that the merits of any
regulative modality cannot be determined without reference to the
state of the industry being regulated. Threat regimes, I suggest, are
important and are best justified when the industry is undergoing rapid
change-under conditions of "high uncertainty." Highly informal
regimes are most useful, that is, when the agency faces a problem in
an environment in which facts are highly unclear and evolving.
Examples include periods surrounding a newly invented technology
or business model, or a practice about which little is known.
Conversely, in mature, settled industries, use of informal procedures
is much harder to justify.
Under conditions of uncertainty, absent the threat mechanism,
the agency would have two options: to make law-through a
rulemaking or adjudication-or to ignore the area altogether. Neither
is particularly satisfying. The former forces the agencies to make law
likely to last a long time based on poorly developed facts, and it
invites long periods of uncertainty created by the judicial review
process. The latter surrenders any public oversight or input during
what may be a critical period of industry development.
rule is nonlegislative."); John F Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 893, 928
(2004) (suggesting possible alternatives to the prevailing judicial approach to distinguishing
between legislative and nonlegislative rules); Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the
Rulemaking Spectrum:Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803,
850 (2001) (cautioning against a judicial approach that encourages agencies to promulgate
informal rules and then to accompany them with the caveat that those rules are not binding).
4. Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of
Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 873, 874.
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Ironically, whereas the procedures designated by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)' are primarily meant to protect
the regulated industry, both industry and agency may sometimes
prefer unenforceable rules and a lack of judicial involvement. Both
agency and industry will sometimes share an interest in an informal
and flexible regime that resembles an unenforceable "letter of intent"
in the world of private contracts. The costs of a slow-moving, ossified
rulemaking or adjudicatory procedure, with its accompanying
uncertainty and litigation costs, fall on both industry and agency.'
Meanwhile, the argument that rule by threat is a means of
avoiding judicial review may be overstated. Threats are, by their
nature, just that: threats to enforce or enact a rule, not binding actions
in the usual sense of that word. Regulated entities that are unhappy
with a de facto regime can and do test the threats, forcing the agency
to use its more formal powers and therefore invoke judicial review.
Similarly, when the industry refuses to comply with agency
commands, or when the agency is unhappy with self-regulation, it
must turn to formal action. As I argue, this fact serves as an important
check on agency power.
It is important to encourage the responsible use of agency threats
and to try to develop a sense of the difference between the proper use
of threats and their abuse, a project for which the last Part of this
Essay offers some potential guidelines. Borrowing from the critics of
threats, I develop a list of domains in which the use of threats is
presumptively abusive and ought to be avoided. Some examples
include using threats to avoid explicit congressional limits on power,
and instances in which the need for very specific guidance is
important. By contrast, in rapidly developing industries in which
rulemaking is impracticable, highly informal methods are justified.
I. THREATS AND WHAT SCHOLARS THINK OF THEM
The regulatory threats that I am interested in encompass a wide
variety of informal agency activity, similar but not identical to the
5. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2006).
6. Ossification in this context refers to a grand slowdown in the process of issuing rules.




statutory category of "interpretative rules."' These activities can
include warning letters, official speeches, interpretations, and private
meetings with regulated parties. As such, the threats I am describing
are in the category of "soft law"-that is, law issued without the
formalities that would make it binding.' To be sure, there are
differences among the many forms of informal action, but in this
Essay I will focus on what makes them similar.
One distinction is important: to be a regulatory threat, in the
sense that I mean, it is essential that the action not simply express
opinions or report on an issue. Rather, the action must give at least
some warning of agency action related to either ongoing or planned
behavior. That distinction leaves out mere policy guidelines, studies,
reports, and similar materials, which can be important documents but
are not the subject of this Essay. The reason I narrow the category to
threats instead of interpretative rules generally is to examine the
agency action most likely to directly influence behavior. In that sense,
the comparison between threats and rulemaking or adjudication
regimes is a comparison between different types of agency action that
share the direct goal of specifying desired behavior.
Agency threats, as I have described them, come in two major
forms. The first is a private threat, of which a warning letter sent to a
company is the paradigmatic example. The other is a public threat,
such as a public speech given by an agency chair, describing what the
agency believes to be unacceptable behavior, coupled with an explicit
or implicit threat of either new rulemaking or enforcement of an
existing rule. Some examples may help clarify each of these
categories.
In 2004, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman
Michael Powell delivered a speech at a well-known
telecommunications conference in Boulder, Colorado.! During the
speech, after various preliminary comments, he delivered a series of
warnings to broadband providers in the cable and telephone
7. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (providing that the notice-and-comment requirement does
not apply to "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice").
8. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61
STAN. L. REv. 573, 579 (2008).
9. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles
for the Industry, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium on "The Digital Broadband




industries. In particular, Powell instructed the industry to respect four
"Internet Freedoms" of every Internet user, including the rights to
reach applications of their choice and to attach devices of their
choosing, like then-new home Wi-Fi devices."o Soon after, the FCC
brought an enforcement action against a small telephone company
that was blocking an Internet application that allowed users to make
inexpensive telephone calls." Powell's speech, with its threats and
subsequent enforcement action, is an example of the kind of public
threat that is the primary interest of this Essay.
In 2009, the Consumer Protection Bureau of the Federal Trade
Commission issued a secret letter to various retailers and
manufacturers of new "bamboo clothing."12 The Commission believed
that the material sold as bamboo fiber was in fact man-made rayon
fabric, not "natural" or "environmentally friendly" as its
manufacturers claimed. The warning letter in question is an example
of a private threat, which led, in that case, to formal enforcement
against various manufacturers.13
Administrative law scholars have spent considerable time
thinking about the informal agency actions that are the subject of this
Essay. These writers-incidentally, all former clerks of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appealsl4-have a natural interest in how the use of
informal methods affects the relationship between agencies and the
federal courts." Stated more formally, they are interested in the legal
status of what they call "nonlegislative rules," a phrase that includes
the agency threats discussed here. For these writers, the central
10. See id. at 5 (advocating the importance of customers having "access to their choice of
legal content" and the ability to "run applications of their choice").
11. See Madison River Commc'ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4297 & n.3 (2005) ("On
February 11, 2005, the Bureau issued a Letter of Inquiry ... to Madison River, initiating an
investigation.").
12. See FCC, COMPANIES RECEIVING LETTERS FROM FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
CONCERNING LABELING AND ADVERTISING OF "BAMBOO" TEXTILES (2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/02/100203company-letter-recipients.pdf (providing a list of the
recipients of the letter).
13. See, e.g., Pure Bamboo, LLC, File No. 0823193 (F.T.C. Aug. 11, 2009), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823193/090811purebambooagree.pdf (detailing suspected
violations and the agreement containing a consent order).
14. David Franklin, Jacob Gersen, Donald Elliot, and John Manning were all clerks on the
D.C. Circuit.
15. See supra note 3.
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question is when a court ought to hold the use of a nonlegislative rule
invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act for want of proper
procedure.16
This Essay addresses a different question: if informational
threats are assumed to be unenforceable, when should agencies
nonetheless use such threats instead of legally binding rules?
Surprisingly, there is comparatively less attention directed to this
question. Instead, most of the scholarship suggests an almost reflexive
distaste for rule by regulatory threat, based on the logic that, in the
words of Professor Robert Anthony, they "dishonor[] our system of
limited government," and can amount to a kind of lawmaking "on the
cheap or on the sly.""
Critics like Professor Anthony argue that the absence of judicial
review or APA process creates several unattractive possibilities. The
first is the absence of safeguards like notice, public participation, and
so on.'" The second is the possibility of an agency exceeding its
delegated powers or disobeying the direct instructions of Congress."
Overall, critics see the use of threats as an endangerment of the
principle of open government or even as an abuse of power.
A study of the "ossification" literature gives a sense of the low
regard in which informal methods are held. A series of works written
in the 1990s despaired of the fact that tough judicial review was
leading agencies to abandon rulemaking in favor of adjudication or,
worst of all, threat regimes.20 Commenting in 1992 on the trend,
Professor Thomas McGarity wrote, "[N]otice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures provide an element of fairness that is wholly
lacking when an agency issues a guidance manual and announces that
16. The classic example of a case that frames the problem this way is Hoctor v. United States
Department of Agriculture, 82 F3d 165, 171-72 (7th Cir. 1996), which declared unenforceable an
informal rule concerning dangerous animals that was issued without notice-and-comment
procedures.
17. Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the
Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1312, 1379
(1992).
18. Id. at 1372.
19. Id. at 1373-74.
20. Some of the major works decrying the ossification of rulemaking include McGarity,
supra note 2; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L.
REV. 59 (1995); and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political




it plans to adhere to it or to some future manifestation of it in future
enforcement actions." 21
A more direct critique is Professor Lars Noah's Administrative
Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of
Authority.22 The phrase "arm-twisting" invites a colorful comparison
between agency officials and unscrupulous professional wrestlers. As
Professor Noah writes, the practice "saddles parties with more
onerous regulatory burdens than Congress had authorized,
accompanied by a diminished opportunity to pursue judicial
challenges." 23 Professor Phil Weiser, a well-known communications
scholar, echoes such criticisms in the context of the FCC.24 On the one
hand, Professor Weiser endorses what he calls "co-regulatory
strategies." 25 But on the other hand, he distinguishes salutary self-
regulation from threats, which, he warns, "run[] counter to
democratic legitimacy and transparency values that inhere in official
agency action." 26
There are a few dissenters from the scholarly attack on informal
agency action. Their leader is Professor Peter Strauss, onetime
general counsel of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
"[I]nterpretative rules, statements of general policy, staff manuals,
and the like," writes Professor Strauss, "are an important element in
the hierarchy of agency law." 27 Interpretative rules, or "publication
rules," are, he says, "common and generally salutary forms of
informal agency action in use well before the Administrative
Procedure Act was enacted in 1946."' Concurring with Professor
Strauss are Professors Eric Posner and Jacob Gersen, who categorize
21. McGarity, supra note 2, at 1396.
22. Noah, supra note 4.
23. Id. at 875.
24. See Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the
Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 675, 708-11 (2009) (noting the flaws in the FCC's
merger review procedures).
25. See Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529,536
(2009) (advocating "a model of co-regulation, whereby a private sector collaborative body
operates under [agency] oversight").
26. Id. at 559.
27. Strauss, supra note 3, at 804.
28. Id. at 805.
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agency threats as a form of "soft law" to which the two ascribe some
useful functions."
Apart from Strauss and his fellow travelers, the scholarly
presumption is that rulemaking or formal adjudication is an
intrinsically superior process for most agency action. The use of
threats is considered an abuse of power, a means of avoiding judicial
review, or perhaps just good old-fashioned laziness. The point of this
Essay is to challenge that general presumption. Rule by threats, I
argue, is, under certain circumstances, a superior means of regulatory
oversight.
II. PROVIDING PUBLIC INPUT UNDER CONDITIONS
OF UNCERTAINTY
Whether the case is stronger for threats or rulemaking depends
on the state of industry. Industries can be divided into two states:
stable and dynamic. In a stable industry, business models are
relatively settled, and the facts relevant to regulation are therefore
likely clearer. Conversely, in a dynamic industry, the agency confronts
what economists call conditions of "high uncertainty."30 As expressed
by economist Frank Knight, uncertainty refers to a situation in which
alternative future states of the world do not occur with quantifiable
probability." More colloquially, many things could happen, and no
one knows what the odds are that any one thing will occur.
What creates a dynamic industry is some kind of external shock
to an existing industry. Examples include disruptive innovation (say,
the invention of radio broadcasting in the 1920s), unexpected market
entry (the Japanese entry into electronics in the 1970s), or the rise of
a new business model (say, pizza delivery). Given such a shock, the
industry's business models begin to change, and the future shape or
function of the industry may be difficult to predict. It is under such
conditions that threat regimes are more justified and, indeed,
attractive.
An agency facing an industry in a state of high uncertainty has
three choices. First, it can make law-through rulemaking or
29. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 8, at 626 (ascribing some useful functions to soft law);
see also Zaring, supra note 2, at 294 (describing and defending the use of "best practices" by
agencies as a means of regulation).
30. See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 197-232 (1921)




adjudication-to deal with emerging concerns. Second, the agency
can forgo any action until the industry quiets down and matters
become clearer. And third, it can watch the growth of the industry
and issue threats that indicate where it has concerns, and possibly
which directions it hopes the industry will grow.
Of the three options, the first-making law-may be the worst
alternative. What sounds attractive is the prospect of an orderly,
planned approach to the future. The problem is that, with so little
known about the industry, issuing specific rules based on guesses
about the future runs a grave risk of creating a bad law, or at least a
law that is much worse than one issued after more development. Such
lawmaking suffers from all of the defects that Friedrich Hayek
identified with central planning-impressive in a world of perfect
information, but terrible in this world.32 The history of the FCC is full
of examples of premature lawmaking. A good example is the
regulation of the early cable television industries, which were crippled
by expansive agency rulemaking in their infancy."
The irony is that early lawmaking, instead of creating clarity,
may put the industry in a very unclear position. Given the
inevitability of a judicial challenge to an important adjudication or
rulemaking, the industry must try to predict which parts of the rule
will survive a lengthy judicial review process that may include several
remands. Further, the industry must predict the outcome of review
under the arbitrary and capricious standard,' which is itself capricious
and arbitrary. This lack of clarity is why, counterintuitively, regulated
industries may prefer an informal process to the legal paralysis
common to formal procedures.
If the law does survive, another problem is that any such law,
once in place, is likely to remain the regulatory foundation for quite
some time. In the case of rulemaking under the APA, changing a rule
requires the same notice-and-comment procedures that attach to the
32. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945)
(criticizing centrally planned economies on informational grounds).
33. In the 1950s, the FCC issued a series of rules for the cable industry that severely limited
the industry's development. The state of the industry in 1970 was captured by Leonard Chazen
& Leonard Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The Visible Hand, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1820, 1820 (1970). For additional history of the regulation of cable television, see Timothy Wu,
Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 315-21 (2005).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
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issuance of a new rule,35 followed by a new opportunity for challenge
and judicial review. These procedures increase the incentive for an
agency to let its first rule also be the last rule. Yet, as just explained,
unless the agency is very lucky, a rule made early in the industry's
development is likely to be deeply flawed and potentially crippling.
The second option-"wait and see"-may sound attractive
because it allows the industry to develop in what might be called a
natural way. This approach, however, makes a great sacrifice: the
public's interest may be entirely unrepresented during the industry's
formative period. The risk is that the industry's norms and business
models will, effectively, be set without any public input. Waiting for
the industry to settle down may result in undesirable practices that
prove extremely hard to reverse or influence with rules issued later.
To state the matter more colloquially, the industry may be "baked"
by the time there is any real oversight or public input.
As an example, consider the over-the-counter derivatives market
that developed in the 1990s and 2000s. Many commentators argue
that waiting, in effect, for the industry to mature before regulating it
contributed to the financial crisis of 2008.' In fact, by the 1990s, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission had begun to think that
oversight of certain derivatives products might be necessary.37 But
Congress barred regulation based on industry arguments that, among
other reasons, the rapidly changing nature of the industry made
regulation ill-advised."
This example aside, there are instances in which "wait and see"
may be a good approach. First, it may precede a threat regime as facts
are being gathered. Second, some industries may not need any public
35. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.412 (2010) (requiring notice-and-comment procedures for most
FCC rule amendments); see also 49 C.F.R. § 601.22 (2010) (requiring notice-and-comment
procedures for most Federal Transit Administration rule amendments).
36. See, e.g., Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (July 1, 2010), available at http://
www.cftc.gov/pressroom/speechestestimony/opagensler-48.html (suggesting that derivatives
"played a central role in the 2008 financial crisis," and urging for greater regulation of
derivatives markets).
37. See Gary Gensler, History of Derivatives Regulation, Culprit OTCs, COMMODITY
ONLINE (last updated July 2, 2010, 15:35 IST), http://www.conmodityonline.com/news/History-
of-derivatives-regulation-culprit-OTCs-29636-2-1.html.
38. In the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.), Congress urged the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in the context of its international activities, to be
mindful that "financial services regulatory policy must be flexible to account for rapidly
changing derivatives industry business practices." Id. § 126, 114 Stat. at 2763A-412.
1850 [Vol. 60:1841
AGENCY THREATS
input, thanks to an absence of any danger to the public or any serious
threat of externalities. Consider, for example, the high fashion
industry, which is a high-uncertainty business, dynamic and ever
changing, but one in which the case for federal oversight seems weak.
Finally, the industry might have already developed an effective
system of self-regulation or best practices. In such a case, the
government can wait and see whether that system fails or succeeds. A
classic example of self-regulation is the familiar G, PG, PG-13, R, and
NC-17 ratings for films-a system that the federal government has
not sought to supplement with its own censorship regime.
The third alternative under conditions of uncertainty is to make
use of some kind of threat. The comparative advantage of a threat
regime is the following: First, it may bake in the public's interest and
opinion during the formative years of an industry without strangling
the industry with premature rules. Second, without the formality of
notice and comment, public threats may lead to a useful public debate
over the industry practice in question. In this case, the very avoidance
of a legalized procedure may, in fact, facilitate a public debate. A
threat speaks to the substance of the matter, whereas lawmaking
often creates a lawyers' debate over comparatively unintelligible
issues like subject-matter jurisdiction or standards of review.
The greatest advantage of a threat regime is its speed and
flexibility. Unlike a rule, a threat is extant the moment it is made-its
final shape, so to speak, is immediately apparent. Meanwhile, if all or
part of the threat regime is perceived as unsuccessful or unnecessary,
the threat can usually be retracted. Similarly, as a matter of
democratic accountability, a new administration can change a threat
regime as soon as it takes power, thereby reflecting, more
immediately, the will of that administration.
Threats are not intended as a permanent solution, but rather as
part of a longer process. If successful and widely respected, it is
possible that a threat may create an industry norm, removing the
need for rulemaking at all. Alternatively, a threat regime may be a
pilot, as it were, for eventual lawmaking. The law created by
rulemaking or adjudication will then benefit from the facts developed
under the threat regime.
Counter to intuition, even if the process specified by the APA is
meant to protect regulatees, the industry may, at times, prefer
guidelines or threats. It may, of course, prefer no regulation, or
hortatory self-regulation most of all. Agencies and industry, facing a
common challenge of uncertainty, may both prefer to work with an
18512011]
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approach that is flexible and avoids litigation that would be expensive
for both sides. There is a parallel, as Professors Posner and Gersen
point out, to the use of letters of intent and other "soft" contracts to
explore the benefits and workability of a given commercial
relationship.' By avoiding a harder, lawyerly procedure, both sides
may benefit.
Some of what I have described can be seen in the reaction to
Michael Powell's 2004 speech 4" The speech set off a lengthy debate
on the potential dangers of blocking and discrimination by Internet
carriers-a debate that generated copious academic literature and
considerable public attention.41 Compared to many of the matters
handled by the FCC, it cannot be said that public debate was wanting.
To some degree, Powell's speech created or reinforced an industry
norm surrounding Internet blocking and similar behavior. Seven
years after his speech, and after a change in administration, the FCC
completed notice-and-comment rulemaking, codifying a rule still
premised on the original speech, with various elaborations based on
seven years of debate.4 2
Powell's speech was an example of a public threat. The case for
the use of private threats is even stronger. Here I have in mind, as a
model, the use of warning letters by enforcement agencies like the
Justice Department or Federal Trade Commission in the enforcement
of various laws, such as consumer protection, fraud, or antitrust. In
these cases, the uncertainty comes from a different source: the agency
simply does not know the facts that bear on the enforcement decision.
The warning letter is a means of factfinding. It may also simply put a
stop to the activity in question, but in any case, it is a necessary
prerequisite to formal action.
The argument that threats sidestep judicial review can be
overstated. On the one hand, there is no denying that the speed and
flexibility of a threat regime comes at some cost. Process is expensive
39. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 8, at 626 ("[N]onenforceable letters of intent . . . set
the stage for negotiations that will culminate in a binding agreement, [and] nonenforceable
contracts ... provide a basis for cooperation but no appeal to the courts. Soft public law has
similar desirable properties. . . .").
40. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
41. As of March 4, 2011, there were about 2.9 million Google search results for the term
"Net Neutrality," and in the Westlaw JLR database, which hosts law reviews, there were 559
documents featuring the phrases "net neutrality" or "network neutrality."
42. See Preserving The Open Internet, 25 FCC Red. 17,905 52 Commc'ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 3
(Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order).
[Vol. 60:18411852
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and slow, and an advantage of a threat regime lies in avoidance of just
those costs.43 But it is also critical to remember that a threat, as I have
described it, is not binding law. In most circumstances, a party
unhappy with the substance of a threat regime can challenge the
threat by ignoring it, thus forcing enforcement of some kind and
opening the threat to judicial review."
The early radio industry provides a classic instance of this
mechanism. Through the 1920s, Secretary of Commerce Herbert
Hoover oversaw the nascent radio industry in a fairly informal
manner. He encouraged self-regulation of the industry but promoted
certain codes of conduct and assigned spectrum bands based on an
implied threat of enforcement. Eventually, by the mid-1920s, the
broadcast industry grew tired of Hoover's informal regime. In 1925,
Zenith Corporation deliberately flouted Hoover's rules and began
using frequencies reserved for Canadians, provoking a potential fight
with the British Empire. 45 Hoover ordered it to stop, but Zenith
refused. A federal district court held that the Radio Act of 1912 had
not delegated to the Secretary the power to criminalize a
broadcaster's failure to adhere to the terms of its license.
Zenith's challenge to Hoover is a classic example of how the
industry can demand a judicial check on the power of mere threats. It
is also important to point out that agencies may often reach a point of
dissatisfaction with mere threats. One reason is that industry
compliance with a threat may often be partially or entirely
dissatisfactory. To claim compliance with the threat, for example, an
industry may create a self-regulatory program that is very weak.
Second, an agency may want to bind later administrations in a more
lasting way-and may therefore turn to its power to make law. For
these and many other reasons, the agency will often have its own
reasons to turn to formal legal procedures under the APA.
This is the case for the use of threats. I do not consider the case
conclusive. As the reader has already noticed, the use of threats relies
on faith that agencies will be good proxies for the public's interest. To
43. Cf Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 400 (1973) (advocating the use of economic theory in
addressing the costs of legal proceedings).
44. Cf E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1491 (1992)
(describing how judicial review affects an agency's choice to use more or less formal means of
regulation).
45. HUGH R. SLoTTEN, BROADCAST TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (2000).
46. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1926).
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be sure, threats can be abused, and are. But that the action can be
abused does not mean that it lacks merit, if used properly.
III. THE ABUSE OF THREATS
To say that a threat regime is useful in some circumstances is not
to say it is useful in all circumstances, or that threats cannot
sometimes be abused. As a general rule, conditions of uncertainty are
likely the strongest justification for the use of threats. Alternatively,
the use of informal means as a direct substitute for rules or
adjudications in settled and mature industries must be viewed with
some suspicion.
This point can be well understood from the famous case of
Hoctor v. United States Department of Agriculture.47 The U.S.
Department of Agriculture had issued what it considered a mere
interpretative rule, specifying that fences meant to contain dangerous
animals must be eight feet tall.48 Judge Richard Posner invalidated an
enforcement action because the rule had failed to comply with the
notice-and-comment requirements of the APA. 49 As a policy matter,
there was little justification in that case for not using the notice-and-
comment procedure.0 The big cats-tigers, lions, and hybrids-at
issue in the case have been a well-known threat to humans for
thousands of years. Moreover, the agency had previously issued
notice-and-comment rules for dog and monkey fences." Hoctor,
therefore, is a good example of a case in which the agency had little
reason to circumvent notice-and-comment procedures.
Beyond this basic division, several other areas can be identified
in which threats may constitute an abuse, as opposed to a useful tool.
The first is when an agency uses threats to take actions that Congress
has specifically barred, or to accomplish objectives for which it would
otherwise lack delegated authority. Professor Noah provides a
number of instances of federal agencies securing from private actors
''voluntary concessions" beyond what the agencies could seek
pursuant to their congressionally granted authority.52
47. Hoctor v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996).
48. Id. at 168.
49. Id. at 171.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Noah, supra note 4, at 876-903.
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The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for example, is
explicitly barred, "except in extraordinary circumstances," from
requiring the preclearance of drug advertising." Nonetheless, the
agency has used the carrot of faster approval procedures to convince
firms to agree to preclearance that the agency would be banned from
mandating directly.54 Another area of concern is that agency threats
may sometimes violate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by
enticing private actors to give up constitutional rights in exchange for
discretionary benefits."
The second area of potential abuse lies in threats issued for
onetime approvals. An agency often faces a regulated entity that
needs agency approval for some matter vital to its business, such as
approval of a merger by the FCC or approval of a drug by the FDA.
In such onetime approvals, the agency has an enormous potential
power that may be effectively unreviewable. The reason is that
approval is such a pressing matter that a prolonged challenge to the
settlement may be unfeasible. Moreover, because the desired
approval usually relates to industry settlements that are entirely
voluntary, it may be unclear exactly what agency action the regulated
industry is challenging.
What constitutes abuse in these situations can be a hard
question. An agency like the FCC or FDA is tasked with general
duties like the protection of the public interest or public health, and
the conditions on approval may represent the agency's sense of its
statutory duties. In the case of the FCC, the agency is tasked to
ensure that any transfer of a broadcast license lies in "the public
interest, convenience and necessity,", 6 making imposed conditions the
execution of congressional will.
A third area is less a matter of abuse than a matter of
inappropriateness. Facts may reach a point at which a precise, static
rule is necessary so that the industry knows exactly what it may and
may not do. A good example is the body of regulations governing
passenger safety on airplanes. The industry is stable and has mature
business models. Airlines need to know exactly which rules they
should adhere to so as to ensure passenger safety in flight-"move
your seat back to the upright position" and so on. Threats, guidelines,
53. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)(3)(A) (2006).
54. Noah, supra note 4, at 931.
55. Id. at 913.
56. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2006).
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policy statements, and the like may simply be too hard to find or too
unclear in such circumstances.
Professor McGarity writes on this problem in the context of
trying to identify Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules.
Here is how he describes one such effort:
[I]f one writes to EPA and requests a copy of SW-846, EPA will
send "Final Update I" to the Third Edition of SW-846, which was
published in November 1990.... If the generator makes its request
very clear, EPA will send Updates I and II of the Second Edition,
which is legally binding to the extent that specific methods are
incorporated by reference in the regulations, but superseded by the
Third Edition for "guidance purposes." The document that EPA
sends, however, will contain the following warning:
Attention
As noted in the NTIS [National Technical Information Service]
announcement, portions of this Report are not legible.
However, it is the best reproduction available from the copy
sent to NTIS.
This example makes obvious a situation in which an informal
guideline is a poor substitute for a published rule.
Fourth, in the context of threatened enforcement actions against
individual firms, the publicity surrounding a threat may constitute the
punishment itself. This is a power that is easily abused. The news that
a federal agency is even investigating the regulatee may do as much, if
not more, damage as any actual fine or punishment. But when the
facts remain genuinely unknown, the punishment may be
unwarranted. This is the problem of conviction by press release.
Although originally a matter of state, not federal, action, the
famous settlement of many of the world's largest investment banks
with several state attorneys general and the Securities and Exchange
Commission at the beginning of the 2000s can illuminate the coercive
effects of publicized suspicion. In 2002, then-New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer held a press conference announcing an
investigation into whether Merrill Lynch was manipulating its
analytics to make certain stocks look more attractive to potential
investors. The public threat of prosecution was enough to incite
Merrill Lynch to settle-without, of course, admitting any
wrongdoing. Ultimately, as the investigation expanded to other firms,
57. McGarity, supra note 2, at 1394-95 (second alteration in original).
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the banks involved agreed to pay "a total of about $1.4 billion in fines
and other penalties.""
Conviction by press release requires an enormous certainty on
the part of the agency that it is actually correct about the misbehavior
in question. Thus, it can be preferable not to publicize warnings or
investigations unless the party reveals the investigation, or the agency
takes formal action.
CONCLUSION
In The Godfather," Don Vito Corleone pursued most of his
regulatory goals using threats. Some were delivered in formats that
would be considered unusual by administrative law standards but did
not want for clarity. Don Corleone resorted to actual enforcement
actions only when absolutely necessary and did not seem to make use
of notice-and-comment procedures.rO
The comparison shows why threats have a bad name, suggesting
why agencies prefer terms like "guidelines" or "interpretative rules."
Nonetheless, whatever the nomenclature, I believe that regulatory
threats are an important tool for agencies dealing with certain types
of problems. As opposed to always trying to encourage the use of
lawmaking procedures, agency watchers and scholars should instead
argue that the power to make threats ought to be used responsibly.
This Essay has proposed a few guidelines toward that end.
58. Adi Ignatius, Wall Street's Top Cop, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 64, 70.
59. THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972).
60. Id.
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